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The graying of the median voter
Abstract
Analyzing 30 OECD-countries in 1980-2005, this paper documents the association of an aging elec-
torate with retirement spending. The ﬁ  rst result is that an increase in the age of the median voter of one 
year is associated with an increase of 0.25 percentage points in retirement spending relative to GDP. The 
second result is that aging does not lead to higher beneﬁ  ts per retiree. Both results also hold for health 
care costs, which are frequently assumed to be positively associated with aging as well. Together, the results 
contradict the main prediction of median voter models that imply that an older median voter successfully 
pushes for higher individual beneﬁ  ts. If anything, a graying median voter is associated with less generous 
pensions. These results are reinforced when health care costs are considered with a time trend proxying for 
technological change. Absent a time trend, health care costs –both relative to GDP and per inhabitant– are 
positively inﬂ  uenced by the age of the median voter.
JEL classiﬁ  cation: C23; H55; J18
Key words: aging; retirement; political economy
Nederlandse samenvatting (Dutch summary)
Deze studie onderzoekt de relatie tussen vergrijzing en pensioenuitgaven in 30 OECD-landen voor 
de periode 1980 en 2005. Ten eerste blijkt dat een toename van de leeftijd van de mediane kiezer met een 
jaar gerelateerd is aan een 0.25 procentpunt hogere pensioenuitgaven als deel van het BNP. Ten tweede laat 
de studie zien dat vergrijzing niet samengaat met hogere pensioenuitkeringen per gepensioneerde. Beide 
resultaten gaan ook op voor kosten voor de gezondheidszorg, waarvan ook vaak wordt verondersteld dat 
zij samengaan met vergrijzing. Samengenomen betekent dit dat geen steun wordt gevonden voor de voor-
spelling dat oudere kiezers in staat zijn pensioenuitgaven te verhogen, zoals verondersteld wordt in mediane 
kiezer modellen. In plaats daarvan gaat de vergrijzende kiezer samen met mindere genereuze pensioenen. 
Het toevoegen van een tijdtrend als controle voor de invloed van technologische verandering op gezond-
heidskosten is cruciaal: zonder deze trend zijn gezondheidszorguitgaven –zowel als deel van het BNP als per 
inwoner– wel positief gerelateerd aan de leeftijd van de mediane kiezer.Page ● 8
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1. Introduction
Aging has called the sustainability of public ﬁ  nance into question (Castles [2004]). According to many 
this has become more pressing with deﬁ  cits of most countries ballooning after nationalization of private 
bank debts. There are two different ways in which aging may positively inﬂ  uence retirement spending.
A ﬁ  rst effect is there are more retirees on the receiving end of Social Security. As a result, aging leads to 
higher retirement beneﬁ  ts relative to GDP. The positive effect of aging on pension expenditures relative to 
GDP could only be counterbalanced by a (dramatic) decrease of beneﬁ  ts per retiree.
A second effect is the increased political clout of the elderly. Median voter models predict that an older 
median voter gives politicians an incentive to increase the generosity of pensions. This will not only lead to 
higher spending relative to GDP but relative to the number of retirees as well.
This paper assesses the empirical support for both these propositions using OECD data from 30 coun-
tries between 1980 and 2005. In this paper we evaluate the demographic impact on public spending on 
retirement relative to GDP and relative to the number of retirees. Additionally the association of aging and 
health care costs is considered. Frequently aging is assumed to be positively associated with health care costs 
as well. For all variables, only public spending is taken into account, disregarding savings via pension funds, 
insurance companies and banks. We are solely interested in the political pressure to increase pensions that 
may or may not arise from an older electorate. As governments can inﬂ  uence public spending directly, this 
measure of pension spending is considered more relevant. Demographic composition of the electorate is 
operationalized by the median age of the population, while robustness checks are carried out with the de-
pendency ratio as the operationalization.
This paper ﬁ  nds empirical support for the proposition that aging leads to more public spending on 
retirement as a share of GDP. An increase of the median age of one year, leads to an increase in public 
spending as a share of GDP with 0.25 percentage points. We do not ﬁ  nd support for the stronger claim. 
If anything, aging inﬂ  uences the generosity of individual beneﬁ  ts negatively, though not signiﬁ  cantly. The 
impact of an older median voter on health care costs crucially depends on whether technological change 
–proxied with a time trend– is included in the regression equation. With a time trend, there is no signiﬁ  cant 
relation. Absent such a trend, the effects correspond with the reasoning of the median voter model.Page ● 10
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These ﬁ  ndings are derived in a ﬁ  xed effect model controlling for several economic and political covari-
ates, including unemployment, GDP per capita, union density, interest rate and the composition of govern-
ment. The results are robust to different operationalizations and model speciﬁ  cations, as documented below.
Two earlier articles investigated the relationship between aging and retirement spending. Breyer and 
Craig [1997] use OECD-data for the period 1960-1990 with 10-year intervals and ﬁ  nd that beneﬁ  ts as a frac-
tion of GDP are positively and signiﬁ  cantly related to the median voter age. Depending on the speciﬁ  cation, 
an increase of one year of the latter increases spending relative to GDP by 0.4-0.6 percentage points. The 
median age is positively but not signiﬁ  cantly related to beneﬁ  ts per pensioner. Tepe and Vanhuysse [2010] 
reach the same conclusions based on 18 countries between 1980 and 2000 using eight-year intervals, while 
operationalizing aging with the dependency ratio instead of the age of the median voter. 
Our contribution is twofold. First, we incorporate more recent data, consider more countries and new 
regressors. We also use more observations (a minimum of 109 whereas Breyer and Craig and Tepe and 
Vanhuysse have a maximum of 76 and 54 observations respectively). This more elaborated and updated 
approach conﬁ  rms their ﬁ  ndings, thereby strengthening these earlier conclusions. The second and novel 
contribution is that we also consider health care costs. Health care costs are often argued to be related to 
aging as well. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the political-economic litera-
ture on Social Security and in particular the predicted effect of aging on contributions and beneﬁ  ts. The 
third section discusses the data and the model. The fourth section shows the results whereas the ﬁ  fth sec-
tion carries out several robustness analyses.Page ● 11
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2.  Theoretical background and related 
literature
There is a well-developed and substantial literature on the political economy of Social Security, see Gal-
asso [2002] for an overview. A dominant view in the literature holds that both contributions and beneﬁ  ts will 
increase due to aging. An older median voter will successfully push for higher beneﬁ  ts.
Browning [1975] is an early contribution highlighting the potential importance of the median voter’s 
age. He proposes that democracies have an intrinsic tendency to ‘overspend’ on Social Security. The main 
argument is that the median voter does not internalize all costs but has all beneﬁ  ts still to come. An older 
median voter thus increases retirement spending.
Browning considers a three-period overlapping generation model in which voting over social security 
takes place once. Government fully commits to the voted upon pension policy forever after. Voters differ in 
age which in turn determines their different preferences over pension spending. A retiree in the third period 
of life wants to maximize beneﬁ  ts, as (s)he does not pay contributions anymore but does receive beneﬁ  ts.   
In contrast, a young voter in the ﬁ  rst period of life has both beneﬁ  ts and contributions ahead and prefers 
the contribution that equates (marginal) costs and (marginal) beneﬁ  ts. The median voter is middle-aged 
(and in the second period of life and working) and likewise still has all the beneﬁ  ts to come but has already 
paid some contributions. Considering the contribution’s sunk costs, the median voter will not internalize all 
costs and prefer higher spending than the young voter. The young voter is the only one who internalizes 
all costs and beneﬁ  ts and thus prefers the efﬁ  cient amount of retirement contributions. The median and 
middle-aged voter is decisive and overspending results. The older the median voter is, the larger retirement 
spending.
This voting failure occurs because younger voters anticipate getting older while older voters know they 
will never be young again. In the literature, demographics is the driving force for pension spending. The 
political effect of aging dwarfs the counteracting economic effect that aging decreases the implicit return 
of a Pay-As-You-Go-arrangement which makes PAYG less attractive. The return is lower because the ratio 
between retirees and the number of workers supporting them decreases.Page ● 12
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Several authors have further developed this basic argument; see Persson and Tabellini [2000], Townley 
[1981] and Galasso [2006]. Calibrating a median voter model, the latter predicts that Spain will increase its 
spending on Social Security from 21.3% of wages to 45.5% and the UK from 14.5% to 33.2%.
The median voter model is important if not dominant in the political-literature. There are however 
several other approaches which sometimes lead to different predictions about the effect of aging. One 
alternative is discussed by Breyer and Stolte [2001]. They postulate that (near) retired generations form a 
majority, holding all political power. This does not lead to contributions of 100% because young generations 
can respond to taxation by adjusting labor supply. The older generations effectively maximize a Laffer curve 
that gives total tax revenues as a function of the tax rate. Breyer and Stolte predict that the ‘burden’ of ag-
ing is shared between retirees and working generation; aging leads to both higher contributions and lower 
individual beneﬁ  ts. The prediction of higher contributions but lower beneﬁ  ts also follows from probability 
voting models. In these models the incumbent party maximizes its political support by maximizing the sum 
of utility of different cohorts, weighing utility proportional to cohort-size, see Hollanders [2009]. Prob-
ability voting models postulate that larger cohorts have more inﬂ  uence but that minorities are not politically 
powerless. It also allows for the possibility that pension policies is not the only factor that voters consider 
in their voting decision.
Another stream of literature understands PAYG arrangements as an intergenerational game where elec-
tions take place each period, not once; see Conesa and Krueger [1999], Cooley and Soares [1999], Cooley 
and Soares [1996]. The repetition of elections leads to multiple equilibria. Generations only contribute to 
retirees if this results in future generations contributing to them. Each generation takes into account the 
behavior of previous generations in a reaction function. This reaction function gives the current contribu-
tion as a function of contributions of previous generations and may be seen as a social contract between 
generations (Sjoblom [1985], Boldrin and Rustichini [2000]). Positive transfers can be supported by the 
threat of future generations withholding future contributions in case current working generations do not 
contribute to current retirees. The default option of each generation is to contribute nothing when working, 
consequently receiving nothing when retired. Any transfer scheme that outperforms this default option can 
result as a subgame perfect equilibrium. A ‘bad’ equilibrium without contributions and without beneﬁ  ts is 
also possible. If no working generation contributes to older generations it is an optimal reaction to do like-
wise, in turn making the zero contributions of the others an optimal response. In this approach, the effect 
of aging is not clear a priori as multiple equilibria are possible.  However, if an effect is predicted, generally 
the median voter reasoning applies. That is, as the median voter gets older, retirement increases.Page ● 13
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Another view is given by Boldrin and Rustichini [2000] who propose that aging leads to the break-down 
of social security altogether. Aging makes PAYG less and less attractive and at one point working genera-
tions stop contributing to social security. Key in their two-period OLG-model is that this moment of break-
down is uncertain because future demographic developments are uncertain. Each generation has the choice 
to continue social security, facing ex ante a positive probability but not certainty the next generation will do 
the same. The last contributing generation will lose ex post, as older generations are not compensated. In 
this approach aging leads to a certain breakdown of social security at an uncertain moment.Page ● 14
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3.  Data and econometric model
Data are retrieved from publicly available sources at the OECD, the Worldbank and the Comparative 






Retirement spending / GDP  162 6.23 2.74 0.1 12.60
Beneﬁ  t / retiree 162 10020.84 4808.92 312.20 26221.99
Health / GDP 135 5.57 1.07 3.13 8.24
Health / inhabitant 135 1350.38 536.06 308.57 4186.19
Median age 180 34.20 4.89 17.43 43.10
Dependency 180 21.81 5.38 7.58 32.55
Unemployment 162 6.72 3.78 0.18 18.76
GDP per capita 170 21310.02 8401.05 4865.44 59888.22
Union density 121 39.99 20.62 8.01 86.62
Interest rate 125 8.72 4.45 1.35 29.03
Government ideology 129 2.48 1.55 1 5
Minority government 171 0.16 0.37 0 1
Single party government 171 0.29 0.46 0 1
For the median age of the electorate the median age of the whole population is used, as reported by the 
Worldbank. This does not coincide with the median age of the electorate that is the crucial factor in many 
theoretical models. We hold that this limitation of the data is not restrictive as both median ages are driven 
by the same two factors, namely fertility rates and mortality rates. A second consideration is that the age of 
the median voter of the electorate does not coincide with the median age of actual voters in any case, as not 
everybody votes (and older voters tend to do so more).
In total four different dependent variables are considered. The ﬁ  rst measure of retirement spending is 
total spending on retirements relative to GDP. This ranges between 0.1% and 12.1%. The following graph 
gives the average retirement spending relative to GDP for 21 countries for which this ﬁ  gure is available in 
each year. The graph also gives health care spending as a share of GDP for the same countries.
1   www.oecd.org, www.worldbank.nl and Armingeon, Engler, Potolidis, Gerber and P. Leimgruber [2010]Page ● 16
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A second measure is beneﬁ  ts per retiree. This ﬁ  gure is derived by dividing total spending by the num-
ber of people older than 64. This is an approximation as it does not take differences in the retirement-age 
into account. The exact number of retirees in countries is unavailable. The number of people over 64 is 
the best approximation available but it is a data limitation all the same. This indicator is also used in other 
investigations of the effects of aging. The next graph provides the development of individual beneﬁ  ts for 
21 countries for which these numbers are available each year; 1980 is the baseline year, indexed 100. It also 
gives the development of health care costs per inhabitant.Page ● 17
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The third variable is healthcare costs relative to GDP, while the fourth dependent variable is health care 
costs per inhabitant. Healthcare costs per retiree are not separately available and are thus not considered. 
This need not be problematic as higher health care costs beneﬁ  t all voters simultaneously and cannot be tar-
geted at a speciﬁ  c group. If retirees successfully plea for higher healthcare spending, this will primarily affect 
healthcare costs per inhabitant. This contrasts with retirement spending where retirees beneﬁ  t immediately, 
whereas younger workers beneﬁ  t later in life, if at all. 
 The regressors can be grouped in economic and political control variables. Unemployment and the in-
terest rate are economic control variables indicating the economic and ﬁ  nancial circumstances of a country 
respectively. High unemployment arguably decreases the scope for social security while a high interest rate 
hinders debt-ﬁ  nancing of retirement expenditure. The effect of GDP per capita is less straightforward. If 
pensions are indexed to GDP, GDP does not effect retirement spending relative to GDP. If this is not the 
case and beneﬁ  ts increase less than GDP, higher GDP is associated with lower retirement spending as a 
share of GDP. There may also be a behavioral effect. If leisure is a superior good, people prefer to spend 
relatively more on it when their income increases. As a result, retirement spending relative to GDP increases. 
Apart from this individual perspective, higher GDP may make it politically easier to redistribute, and this 
would lead to higher pensions as well.Page ● 18
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Political factors other than the age of the median voter may be important as well. The ﬁ  rst factor con-
sidered is union density, ranging from 8% to 86%. A strong union may successfully press for higher beneﬁ  ts 
for their (former) members. A government of left-wing signature may likewise lead to higher beneﬁ  ts. The 
ideological signature of the government is indicated by the proportion of the government that is made 
up of left-wing parties. There were 59 governments that were exclusively made up of right-wing parties 
whereas 26 governments were only occupied by left-wing parties. We further include dummy variables for 
two features of government composition. A ﬁ  rst dummy indicates whether the government consists of a 
single party. Such a government may be either more effective in pushing through its own agenda or may shy 
away from policy changes as blame cannot be shared with other parties. A second dummy indicates whether 
the government is a minority government or not. A government without a majority in the parliament is 
arguably less effective in pushing through its own preferred policy.
The period 1980-2005 is chosen solely for practical considerations of data availability. A longer period 
would contribute to the testing possibilities of the data set. We do not consider one year intervals but ﬁ  ve-
year intervals instead. The reason is that pension reforms need time to be developed, discussed and im-
plemented; consequently reforms are not implemented yearly. A ﬁ  ve-year period is chosen as that covers a 
political cycle in which one (or more) reform can take place. There is also a more practical reason to dismiss 
one year intervals. In one year from the other, the median age hardly changes and estimation results would 
not be robust because of it.
The econometric model used is a panel data model with ﬁ  xed effects, estimated with the within-estima-
tor. Pooled regression leads to an inconsistent estimator whenever time-unvarying country-speciﬁ  c effects 
(like habit formation, geography, culture, path-dependent policies) are correlated with covariates. Exactly 
the same holds for the random effects estimator. If the crucial assumption that ﬁ  xed effects are uncorre-
lated with all regressors does hold, the ﬁ  xed-effect estimator used here is still unbiased and consistent, but 
less efﬁ  cient than the random effects estimator. The base-line regression model is given by the following 
equation:
yi,t=αi+β1Medianagei,t+ β2Unemploymenti,t+ β3Interest ratei,t+ 
β4GDP-per-capitai,t+β5governmentideologyi,t+ β6Minority governmenti,t+ β7Single-party-
governmenti,t+εi,t  i=1,2,..,30, t=1980, 1985,..,2005 Page ● 19
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Here yi,t is one of the dependent variables that were discussed: retirement spending relative to GDP and 
relative to the total number of retirees. For health care costs a time trend is added to proxy technological 
change that improves medical care but also increases medical spending.
In principle the data cover 30 countries over 6 periods, leading to potentially 180 observations. A con-
siderable amount of observations are however missing, in particular from former Communist countries 
prior to 1990. The base-line model is estimated using 109 observations. This leads to an (unavoidable) loss 
in efﬁ  ciency of the estimators. There is no reason to assume that the missing observations are correlated 
with the effect we are interested in, so we do not consider it likely that the estimators are biased.Page ● 20
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4. Results
The median age of the population positively and signiﬁ  cantly affects spending as a share of GDP, as 
table 2 indicates. An increase of one year is associated with an increase of 0.25 percentage point of GDP. 
With a t-statistic of 3.1, this estimation is (highly) signiﬁ  cant. The R2 equals 0.50; while this is reasonable 
high, not too much can be inferred from it. There is no statistical theory underlying R2 and it increases when 
ever more variables are included, irrespective of their relevance. 
The median age does not positively affect the size of beneﬁ  ts. Quite the opposite, it has a substantial 
negative effect. The associated t-statistic equals 1.8 and the estimation is thus not signiﬁ  cant at a signiﬁ  cance 
level of 0.05, though it is signiﬁ  cant with a signiﬁ  cance level of 0.1. The R2 equals 0.78. This is again reason-
ably high but again not too much can be made of that. The regression shows no evidence for the claim of 
median voter models that an older median voter successfully presses for higher retirement spending.
Table 2
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Retirement spending/GDP Beneﬁ  ts / retiree




GDP per capita 1.17e-05 0.575***
(4.24e-05) (0.0662)
Union density 0.0391** 45.71*
(0.0161) (25.21)
Government ideology -0.0256 -84.45
(0.0667) (104.2)
Minority government -0.672** -760.5*
(0.284) (443.6)
Single government  0.306 424.5
(0.295) (461.0)






Number of countries 21 21Page ● 22
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The effect of other covariates varies. Both union density and unemployment are positively and signiﬁ  -
cantly associated with higher retirement spending relative to GDP. The ﬁ  rst effect is as expected, but the 
latter effect is at odds with the notion that higher employment enables higher spending by increasing the 
number of working people that shoulder the beneﬁ  ts. The effect is thus not explainable with the present 
analysis. The same holds for the positive effect on the size of beneﬁ  ts. A minority government spends less 
on retirement spending as a share of GDP whereas GDP per capita positively inﬂ  uences the size of retire-
ment beneﬁ  ts.
Table 3 provides regressions with health care costs as the dependent variable. The effect of the median 
age on health care costs relative to GDP is positive yet insigniﬁ  cant. The effect on health care costs per 
inhabitant is likewise insigniﬁ  cant, whereas the sign of the coefﬁ  cient is negative. In both regressions there 
is a positive and signiﬁ  cant time trend in spending on health care. This time trend can be interpreted as 
a proxy for technological change. Quality-improving technological medical advances often lead to higher 
costs. These can in themselves not be attributed to aging. Were one to omit the time trend, the conclusions 
change substantially if not dramatically. In such a speciﬁ  cation the median age is positively, substantially and 
signiﬁ  cantly associated with health care costs. A crucial factor in the discussion on the inﬂ  uence of aging on 
health care spending is thus whether one views technology an autonomous determinant of health care costs 
and -if so- whether a time trend is a good proxy for it. From an econometric viewpoint, omitting a relevant 
variable is often considered worse than adding an irrelevant variable. In the ﬁ  rst case all estimates are biased 
and inconsistent whereas the latter case leads to a loss of efﬁ  ciency. The more general model here includes 
the time trend, leading to the conclusion that the median age is not associated with health care costs.Page ● 23
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Table 3 







      
Median age 0.0196 -5.601 0.207*** 44.36***
(0.0852) (21.49) (0.0648) (16.43)
Unemployment -0.0796** -18.63** -0.0209 -2.990
(0.0327) (8.256) (0.0285) (7.233)
GDP per capita -0.000104** 0.0333*** -7.87e-06 0.0590***
(4.42e-05) (0.0111) (3.38e-05) (0.00859)
Union density -0.0174 -2.024 -0.0247* -3.969
(0.0124) (3.133) (0.0129) (3.269)
Government ideology -0.0534 -13.80 -0.0329 -8.363
(0.0509) (12.83) (0.0532) (13.51)
Minority government -0.426* -84.41 -0.458** -93.16
(0.215) (54.23) (0.227) (57.52)
Single government  0.101 10.01 0.189 33.51
(0.225) (56.73) (0.236) (59.79)
Interest rate 0.0766** 16.40* 0.0350 5.331
(0.0385) (9.696) (0.0382) (9.681)
year_unit 0.591*** 157.4***
(0.186) (46.96)
Constant 6.742** 484.8 -0.558 -1458**
(3.185) (803.0) (2.325) (590.0)
Observations 109 109 109 109
R-squared 0.507 0.889 0.444 0.873
Number of countries 21 21 21 21Page ● 24
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5. Robustness  checks
The models estimated so far rest on several assumptions and operationalizations for which there are 
sensible and defendable alternatives. Therefore this section considers several deviations from the model 
speciﬁ  cation with the focus on retirement spending. The question is whether the main conclusions are ro-
bust to changes in the model set-up. First, the regressions are re-estimated using heteroskedasticity-robust 
estimations of the standard error. This leaves the estimated coefﬁ  cients unchanged, but estimated standard 
errors slightly differ. The overall conclusions of signiﬁ  cance of the variables do not change however.
Policy changes may need some time to respond to the political inﬂ  uence exercised by the median voter. 
First a government needs to be elected and installed and thereafter it takes usual a considerable time to 
design, implement and actually execute any reform the government wants to push through. For that reason 
a lagged value of the median voter is considered. As can be seen, the sign of the estimated effects remain 
the same but the effects are not signiﬁ  cant anymore. An important reason is that using lagged values di-
minishes the number of observations that can be used; lagged values of the variables are not available for 
1980. The number of observations decreases to 92, which may be too low to estimate nine parameters in a 
single model.
Thus far the median age of the population has been used as the operationalization of aging. The me-
dian age is the crucial factor in the political-economic literature. There are however other notions of aging 
in the broader pension literature, in particular the dependency ratio. This ratio gives the number of retirees 
for each 100 persons in working age (15-64 year). This ﬁ  gure is prominent in many discussions as it gives 
the proportion between the elderly and the working people “supporting” them. The conclusions for this 
alternative operationalization of aging do not differ substantially, as the tables indicate.
The baseline regression is estimated with 109 observations. When fewer regressors are used, more 
observations can be considered. When the omitted variables are relevant (as we expect a priori) this gener-
ally leads to biased estimates. The estimation results are thus invalid, but can be useful nonetheless as their 
standard errors are smaller due to the increased number of observations. Regressions with 155 observations 
but fewer covariates again lead to the same conclusions of earlier regressions. Including a time trend –like 
in the regression of health care expenditure– does affect the results (not shown here, but available upon 
request). The median age then has a negative and signiﬁ  cant impact on the generosity of pensions and an 
insigniﬁ  cant though still positive effect on beneﬁ  ts per GDP.Page ● 26
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Table 4








      
Median age 0.252*** -231.1*
(0.0950) (136.4)
Unemployment 0.153*** 314.1*** 0.149*** 247.8***
(0.0338) (68.88) (0.0437) (61.75)
GDP per capita 1.17e-05 0.575*** 6.53e-05 0.500***
(5.14e-05) (0.101) (4.64e-05) (0.0656)
Union density 0.0391** 45.71 0.0353 53.00
(0.0176) (28.75) (0.0236) (33.36)
Government ideology -0.0256 -84.45 -0.0189 19.63
(0.0722) (114.3) (0.0772) (109.2)
Minority government -0.672** -760.5* -0.547* -912.4**
(0.300) (400.9) (0.322) (454.5)
Single government  0.306 424.5 -0.146 185.4
(0.369) (632.7) (0.373) (527.3)
Interest rate -0.0149 -43.31 -0.0674 -11.01
(0.0506) (82.02) (0.0569) (80.36)
Median age (lagged) 0.0242 -34.18
(0.0248) (35.03)
Constant -5.008 2340 2.733 -3182
(3.217) (4233) (2.009) (2839)
Observations 109 109 92 92
R-squared 0.499 0.778 0.369 0.753
Number of countries 21 21 21 21Page ● 27
The graying of the median voter
Table 4. (continued)
  (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES Retirement 
spending/GDP
Beneﬁ  ts/retiree Retirement 
spending/GDP
Beneﬁ  ts/retiree
      
Median age 0.317*** 19.13
(0.0512) (83.15)
Unemployment 0.154*** 286.0*** 0.150*** 244.0***
(0.0296) (54.68) (0.0334) (54.21)
GDP per capita 9.16e-05*** 0.505*** -4.06e-05 0.414***
(3.00e-05) (0.0555) (2.49e-05) (0.0405)
Union density 0.0278** 56.93**
(0.0135) (24.89)
Government ideology -0.0350 -100.2
(0.0574) (106.0)
Minority government -0.403 -739.1
(0.250) (461.3)
Single government  0.277 469.5
(0.254) (469.1)




Constant -2.805* -4087 -4.904*** -1277
(1.516) (2799) (1.376) (2236)
Observations 109 109 155 155
R-squared 0.628 0.769 0.440 0.709
Number of countries 21 21 30 30Page ● 28
D.A. Hollanders and F. KosterPage ● 29
The graying of the median voter
6.  Discussion and conclusion
This paper analyzes whether an older population and thus an older electorate lead to higher pension 
spending. Pension spending –as a share of GDP– is indeed positively associated with an increase both in 
the median age and in the dependency ratio. This is not surprising as more people are entitled to pension 
beneﬁ  ts (for which they contributed earlier in life).
The much stronger claim that a graying electorate successfully pushes for more pension beneﬁ  ts per 
retiree, predicted by many political-economic models, is not supported. This association is the main and 
often sole prediction of median voter models on Social Security. While such models have much analytical 
merit, these results nonetheless challenge the prominent if not exclusive role attributed to the median voter 
in explaining and predicting welfare state changes.
Including health care spending reinforces these two results when technological change is proxied with a 
time trend. Technological change is arguably an independent determinant of medical care costs by introduc-
ing quality-improving yet cost-increasing innovations. If one does not deem technological change a relevant 
factor –or a time trend not a convincing proxy–, health care spending is positively effected by the age of 
the median voter. 
Taken together, the median voter model does not adequately describe the development of pension ben-
eﬁ  ts. Whether it correctly predicts health care costs, crucially depends on the importance one attaches to 
technological factors. At the very least this suggests that other factors –apparently offsetting the increased 
political clout of retirees– are important. The results suggest that the role of unions have a signiﬁ  cant effect 
on political outcomes. Other potential important aspects include lobbying of insurance companies, altru-
ism of older voters, political institutional features, party-government dynamics and the role of media and 
ideology. Ignoring these factors leads to an incomplete discussion about the sustainability of public ﬁ  nance.Page ● 30
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